Transatlantic Policy Dangles Inside Washington: Disquiet Rings Among European Leaders
By Cameron Munter, Skytop Contributor / December 13th, 2021
Cameron Munter served as ambassador to Pakistan at the time of the Bin Laden raid. He was ambassador to Serbia during the Kosovo independence crisis. He served twice in Iraq, in Mosul as Provincial Reconstruction Leader and in Baghdad as Deputy Chief of Mission. In the course of three decades as a career diplomat, he was also NSC Director in the Clinton and Bush White Houses, and served overseas in Warsaw, Prague, and Bonn.
Munter studied at Cornell and earned a PhD in history from Johns Hopkins, and has taught at Pomona College, Columbia University School of Law, and UCLA.
Currently a consultant in New York, Munter was President and CEO of the East West Institute, a nonprofit engaged in global conflict prevention. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the American Academy of Diplomacy, and serves on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards.
Transatlantic Doctrine of the Past and Well
After our long hiatus caused by Covid-19 here in Europe, it is conference season again. As we return to engaging in person following two years of observing political events and noting their potential impact, the transatlantic relationship resonates as though it were a light beam for drawing in audiences. Europeans and global policy experts are diving into the election of President Biden. Weighing in on an anticipated modernized transatlantic doctrine, European leaders hold tight, with looming doubt, for a signal as to how America will refresh its partnership with Europe. What emerges is an assessment of the shortcomings of America’s politics, read through the hush of the Administration’s languor.
Europe’s concern is driven from the damage caused by the Trump Era, with increasing attention given to assessing the Biden Administration’s projection of the transatlantic relationship.
Biden Administration, Yesterday and Today
Most European leaders heaved a sigh of relief when President Biden took office. He’s a known quantity; he’s been a staunch supporter of multilateralism, the civic religion of most mainstream European leaders. Above all–European leaders reasoned–he was predictable.
In quiet asides, some European leaders and experts expressed understanding of President Trump’s frustration with European inability to invest in its own defense or hardline approach to China. Yet nearly all were put off by his mercurial approach to public affairs and governance. The amateurism displayed by so many of his advisors, and by his general disdain for democratic norms, only added to a general tone of uncertainty here.
So has the first year of Joe Biden reassured them? Not as much as they had hoped.
European View on American Foreign Policy
First, let’s draw a distinction among Europeans. There are the Big Europeans (Germany and France, then Britain as a bit of a post-Brexit outsider, and the institutions of the EU) and then there are the Small Europeans (with apologies to Italy or Poland, just about everyone else).
The first area where there is unease is among the Small Europeans who feel somewhat neglected. They see their stated friends, the seasoned veterans of foreign policy who populate the positions of power in the Biden administration, as having their attention turned elsewhere. Secretary of State Blinken, National Security Advisor Sullivan, CIA chief Burns, and the State Under Secretary Nuland are all focused on the broad functional issues of environment, pandemics, trade, digital governance, and above all China.
These are indeed the priorities of a global power with an overarching strategic vision. They are, as well, the topics discussed by Biden’s team in Brussels, Berlin, and Paris.
Smaller Europeans Feel Differently
Now, it’s not entirely fair to claim, as the Small Europeans do, that the Biden administration is ignoring them. Top level officials from State and the Pentagon have engaged personally from the Baltics to the Balkans.
However, two elements are missing, as seen through the lens of smaller European countries.
One, ironically, was the scatter shot media-driven approach of the Trump administration that was—in fact—welcome by smaller European countries for its specificity and location. They appreciated the President courting the rightist government in Warsaw or bringing the heads of state of Serbia and Kosovo to Washington for what was presented as a peace initiative yet more likely a photo-op.
There was and remains, in parts of “peripheral Europe” (mainly on its eastern edge), a greater sense of insecurity and threat. The actions of dictators like Lukashenko or scenes of miserable migrants huddled in camps in Turkey or Lebanon shine light on why the role of the United States in Europe may be read differently on the Rhine and the Rhone.
Many of the smaller eastern Europeans still believe in America as the ultimate guarantor of the security of the continent in specific locations. They see the Biden administration as focused on “core Europe” as its partner in global affairs, perhaps to the detriment of those farther from the center of the continent.
Dim Views on Washington’s Logjam
Europeans see the second element as incomprehensible–the logjam in Washington that prevents ambassadors from taking their posts.
Yes, they say, you Americans have your quirks, like sending fundraisers from political campaigns to places like Norway and Portugal. Likewise–yes, your system requires extensive background checks that mean it takes months for potential office holders to qualify for their positions. But now, a year into the Biden administration, both political and career candidates for key embassies are held up. No one in London or Paris or Berlin. No one in Prague or Budapest. Only extensive and exhausting horse-trading has allowed special cases–such as the ambassador to NATO, or political appointees to Greece and Turkey–to take their posts.
It’s clear to top leaders in Europe that this is the result of the dysfunction of current American politics where it is the determination of one party to make the other party fail–even if American interests are damaged.
Even at the local level, when U.S. businesses seek an American voice to make their case abroad, when representatives of America might reassure allies troubled by crises, empty spots atop foreign chanceries are simply not understood.
Disinformation and Political Propaganda Against a New Backdrop
In an era of disinformation and various sorts of hybrid competition, if not warfare, it’s not hard to turn such problems into a general statement: the Americans used to care about you, but now they don’t anymore.
This line of propaganda continues: Biden may have seemed like a throwback to the good old days, but the largely imagined, but still powerful image of democracies standing shoulder-to-shoulder don’t seem to be returning. This is ironic: a new generation of voters is beginning to support post-populist governments with a rather non-ideological pro-American cast. (Please refer to my recent piece entitled, “Upset Election in the Czech Republic: Voters Send a Flare Up for the West to Follow”).
It’s been decades since the Cold War ended and new voters are neither naïve idealists or cynical manipulators of the changes that came in its wake. This new cohort is interested when America talks about fighting corruption or defending human rights; but it does wonder whether the rather questionable domestic policies of a Senator holding back ambassadors or broader domestic problems in America make the transatlantic bond less reliable, less secure. Populist leaders and their Russian bot friends play on these themes, with some success.
Credit Due for the Biden Administration
Nonetheless, to its credit, the Biden administration plows forward, patiently addressing important issues. It has arranged a ceasefire between Airbus and Boeing on key issues, sought to solve the steel tariff problem, and created a Trade and Technology Council to address vital issues of the future.
It is committed to working with EU leaders on the crisis between Russia and Ukraine, and on the ever-worrisome challenges in the Western Balkans. Recent conferences on transatlantic relations find areas of cooperation that identify the road ahead for like-minded democracies of the North Atlantic. They are immensely relieved that the Secretary of State is a reasonable man who speaks foreign languages and genuinely wants a strong bond so that America and Europe can face global issues together.
A Disquieting Ring
Not only is Europe a partner. When looking back at the Maastricht Treaty (1992), where the Euro as a currency was born, and the Lisbon Treaty (2007), where more centralized leadership in foreign policy was established, America didn’t need a Europe policy. Europe and America simply needed to figure out how to bring progress to the world. But that is not to be in the backdrop of today’s order.
The ultimate fear: what if Trump returns? None of the conference attendees are apparently able to address this last, but very real, question.